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In	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠyears	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠof	 ﾠincome	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠin	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠhas	 ﾠshifted	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
raising	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠto	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvariability	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠ(Freshwater	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠHeadley,	 ﾠ2004;	 ﾠGardner	 ﾠ1992).	 ﾠSeveral	 ﾠexplanations	 ﾠexist	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshift	 ﾠin	 ﾠfocus,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠmost	 ﾠcompelling	 ﾠare:	 ﾠfirst,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠ
household	 ﾠincome	 ﾠis	 ﾠnow	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠincome	 ﾠof	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠhouseholds,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠsecond,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠof	 ﾠmaintaining	 ﾠincome	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠto	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠface	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
trade	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐output	 ﾠdistorting	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠprograms.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠpractice,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
fundamental	 ﾠargument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
exposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠenterprises,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠwould	 ﾠsay	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠabove	 ﾠthose	 ﾠfacing	 ﾠother	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠbusinesses,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠinduce	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠ
production	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠsocially	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐optimal	 ﾠ(OECD,	 ﾠ2000,	 ﾠHarwood,	 ﾠHeifner,	 ﾠ
Coble,	 ﾠPerry	 ﾠand	 ﾠSomarwu,	 ﾠ1999;	 ﾠCAPI,	 ﾠ2004).	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠhas	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
externality	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠless	 ﾠefficient	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
provision	 ﾠof	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠtools	 ﾠallows	 ﾠboth	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠand	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠto	 ﾠbenefit.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
smaller	 ﾠthan	 ﾠare	 ﾠusually	 ﾠstated.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠfarming	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠrisky	 ﾠactivity,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcontend	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
majority	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarmers,	 ﾠoperating	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠof	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠand	 ﾠsizes,	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠstrategies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠappear	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
provided	 ﾠby	 ﾠgovernments.	 ﾠConsequently,	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠare	 ﾠused	 ﾠless	 ﾠ
frequently	 ﾠthan	 ﾠis	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠby	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠmakers,	 ﾠunless	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠcontain	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠ
level	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubsidy.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠare	 ﾠreally	 ﾠincome	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠ
policies,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠraise	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠincome	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠincome	 ﾠ
variability.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠquite	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
fact	 ﾠsocially	 ﾠundesirable.	 ﾠHigh	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubsidy	 ﾠallegedly	 ﾠmade	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠ
risk	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠdisincentives	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠschemes	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmay	 ﾠalso	 ﾠinduce	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠto	 ﾠundertake	 ﾠriskier	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠthan	 ﾠare	 ﾠsocially	 ﾠ
desirable.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠContext	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠis	 ﾠpervasive,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
exception	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠfew	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠexport	 ﾠoriented	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠNew	 ﾠZealand	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Australia	 ﾠ(OECD,	 ﾠ2009a).	 ﾠRelatively	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠin	 ﾠplace	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
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1	 ﾠThis	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠpresentation	 ﾠmade	 ﾠat	 ﾠan	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠworkshop	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
agricultural	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠheld	 ﾠin	 ﾠParis	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ22-ﾭ‐23,	 ﾠ2010.	 ﾠUseful	 ﾠ
comments	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠworkshop	 ﾠparticipants	 ﾠare	 ﾠgratefully	 ﾠacknowledged.	 ﾠ
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University	 ﾠof	 ﾠKentucky.	 ﾠmost	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠextended	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠof	 ﾠtime	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠmost	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstated	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsurvival	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠfarm.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠ
farm	 ﾠis	 ﾠseen	 ﾠas	 ﾠfully	 ﾠowned	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠand	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠfull	 ﾠtime	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
nuclear	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠfor	 ﾠperiods	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠgenerations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
family	 ﾠare	 ﾠengaged	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠintergenerational	 ﾠcontinuity.	 ﾠ
Thus	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠis	 ﾠtreated	 ﾠdifferently	 ﾠby	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠin	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠother	 ﾠrespects	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠ
high	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠincome	 ﾠsupport.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠdesirable	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠ
structure,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsecond,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcontinuity	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠ
ownership	 ﾠover	 ﾠmultiple	 ﾠgenerations.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠoccupations	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
businesses	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠlike	 ﾠthis	 ﾠare	 ﾠwidely	 ﾠapplicable.	 ﾠ
Yet,	 ﾠin	 ﾠmost	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠhas	 ﾠdrifted	 ﾠaway	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidealized	 ﾠ
depiction	 ﾠof	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠdefined	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠobjectives.	 ﾠA	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠ
farms	 ﾠnow	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠ(OECD,	 ﾠ2000,	 ﾠp.47-ﾭ‐48),	 ﾠ
while	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠpart-ﾭ‐time	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbulk	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠ
population.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsteadily	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠassets,	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
income	 ﾠover	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠdecades,	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpense	 ﾠof	 ﾠtraditional,	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠsize,	 ﾠfull-ﾭ‐
time	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠoccupy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠsize	 ﾠdistribution.	 ﾠHistorically,	 ﾠincome	 ﾠ
support	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠaided	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtransition	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
commodity	 ﾠoutput,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠboth	 ﾠan	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠ
growth	 ﾠ(Gardner,	 ﾠ2006;	 ﾠSchmitz,	 ﾠFurtan,	 ﾠBayliss,	 ﾠ2002).	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠphenomenon	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsteady	 ﾠshift	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠfull	 ﾠtime	 ﾠto	 ﾠpart	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ
farming	 ﾠ(OECD,	 ﾠ2003).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠshift	 ﾠoccurs	 ﾠat	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠlevels.	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠeasy	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspouse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoperator	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
off-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠwork.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠreplaced	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwas	 ﾠless	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠ
full-ﾭ‐time	 ﾠworker.	 ﾠSpecialization	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommodities	 ﾠreinforced	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
trend	 ﾠ(Dimitri,	 ﾠEffland	 ﾠand	 ﾠConklin,	 ﾠ2005).	 ﾠAs	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠ
population	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠfor	 ﾠspouses	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
human	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠoff	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠfor	 ﾠboth	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠfulfillment	 ﾠand	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠreasons.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠ
finally,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠin	 ﾠrural	 ﾠareas	 ﾠexpanded	 ﾠthere	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠemployment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠincreasingly	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠmost	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠthese	 ﾠarguments	 ﾠare	 ﾠnow	 ﾠ
equally	 ﾠapplicable	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠoperator	 ﾠ(OECD,	 ﾠ2009c).	 ﾠInitially	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmade	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠby	 ﾠoperators	 ﾠapplied	 ﾠto	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwere	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠ
minimum	 ﾠefficient	 ﾠscale,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠincome	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠsources	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
mechanism	 ﾠto	 ﾠallow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠto	 ﾠeither	 ﾠgrow	 ﾠto	 ﾠfull	 ﾠtime	 ﾠstatus,	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠremain	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠlife-ﾭ‐
style	 ﾠactivity.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnow	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠand	 ﾠvery	 ﾠ
large	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠhave	 ﾠoperators	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
form	 ﾠof	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠor	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠincome.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠefficient	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠhire	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠoperations	 ﾠand	 ﾠemploy	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠskills	 ﾠin	 ﾠoperating	 ﾠ
both	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠ	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠbusiness.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠissue	 ﾠof	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠis	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconsideration	 ﾠof	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠ
policy	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠraises	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠincome	 ﾠdiversification	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠof	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhouseholds.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠso,	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
need	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠsubsidized	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfarming?	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠunwillingness	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
adopt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠhave	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠunless	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠsubsidized	 ﾠ(OECD,	 ﾠ2009b,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ38).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠ
starts	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠin	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠis	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠaverse.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠan	 ﾠactuarially	 ﾠfair	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠ
mitigation	 ﾠtoll	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprice	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠit.	 ﾠOf	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
possible	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠmodest	 ﾠsubsidy	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠto	 ﾠovercome	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠreluctance	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
commit	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠunfamiliar	 ﾠpolicy,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠprograms	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠin	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
long	 ﾠperiods	 ﾠand	 ﾠsubsidy	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfar	 ﾠabove	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠtrigger	 ﾠ
adoption	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠskeptical	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠaverse	 ﾠindividual.	 ﾠ
Why	 ﾠDo	 ﾠFarmers	 ﾠReject	 ﾠUnsubsidized	 ﾠRisk	 ﾠManagement	 ﾠPrograms?	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠreluctance	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠtools	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
policy	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnumerous	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠexplanations.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠit	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠreflects	 ﾠdiscrepancies	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠfarmers’	 ﾠreality	 ﾠand	 ﾠanalysts’	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠabout	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠattitude,	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠ
perception,	 ﾠand	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠtools.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
First,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠare	 ﾠeither	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠaverse,	 ﾠor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠfail	 ﾠto	 ﾠfully	 ﾠ
understand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠthat	 ﾠface	 ﾠthem	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsistently	 ﾠunderstate	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠThis,	 ﾠ
however,	 ﾠappears	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠimplausible	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠinconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
farmers.	 ﾠOf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠremaining	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠfarmer’s	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠcombination	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfarmers’	 ﾠdecisions.	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠmakers	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠ
assessments	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠand	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠtools.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ
makers	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠoverstating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠand	 ﾠunderstating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠis	 ﾠcalibrated	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠfacing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠfarmer	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
reflecting	 ﾠvery	 ﾠmany	 ﾠactual	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠcircumstances	 ﾠdiverge	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
average	 ﾠin	 ﾠmultiple	 ﾠdimensions.	 ﾠ(that	 ﾠwould	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderestimation	 ﾠof	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
effect	 ﾠof	 ﾠaveraging	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvariance?)	 ﾠIf	 ﾠwe	 ﾠlook	 ﾠonly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreflecting	 ﾠany	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠfarm,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhow	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwe	 ﾠknow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
systematically	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠoverestimation	 ﾠof	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalyst?	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠ
management	 ﾠprograms	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠactuarial	 ﾠapproaches	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
individual	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠquite	 ﾠdifferent.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠan	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠsome	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
zero	 ﾠor	 ﾠone	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠoutcomes.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠevent	 ﾠeither	 ﾠoccurs	 ﾠor	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠoccur.	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠeither	 ﾠa	 ﾠherd	 ﾠof	 ﾠcattle	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhas	 ﾠhoof	 ﾠand	 ﾠmouth	 ﾠdisease	 ﾠor	 ﾠit	 ﾠ	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠ
not.	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevent	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdisease	 ﾠ
across	 ﾠall	 ﾠfarms,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠfarmer	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠmeaningful	 ﾠevent	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
disease	 ﾠstrikes	 ﾠhis	 ﾠor	 ﾠher	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠherd.	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠthird	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠperception	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠmakers	 ﾠand	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠ
approach	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠperspective.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ
makers	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠnexus	 ﾠis	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhousehold.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠrisky	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠ
differs	 ﾠconsiderably	 ﾠdepending	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠoccurs.	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠ
level	 ﾠa	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠconsequences,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠseen	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠ
especially	 ﾠif	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠwealth	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠincome	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠwealth,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠquite	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠin	 ﾠmagnitude.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠfourth	 ﾠreason	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠmay	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmitigation	 ﾠtools	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
belief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠconsequence	 ﾠevents	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcovered	 ﾠby	 ﾠad	 ﾠhoc	 ﾠdisaster	 ﾠresponse.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
all	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaid	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
farmers	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠevent	 ﾠoccurs,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠflooding,	 ﾠanimal	 ﾠdisease	 ﾠ
pandemics,	 ﾠor	 ﾠother	 ﾠdisasters	 ﾠthat	 ﾠspread	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠregion	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
significant	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠproducers.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠenvironment	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠprograms	 ﾠ
provide	 ﾠfar	 ﾠless	 ﾠactual	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdesigners	 ﾠcalculate,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
anticipate	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠparticipate	 ﾠin	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠprograms.	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠfifth	 ﾠreason,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠ
mitigation	 ﾠstrategies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmay	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠmake	 ﾠpublicly	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠtools	 ﾠirrelevant.	 ﾠOnly	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubsidy	 ﾠ(income	 ﾠenhancement)	 ﾠleads	 ﾠto	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠ	 ﾠadopting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtool,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠincome	 ﾠeffect.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠa	 ﾠfarmer	 ﾠalready	 ﾠhas	 ﾠan	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠstrategy,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠeven	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubsidized	 ﾠpremium	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
policy	 ﾠtool	 ﾠimposes	 ﾠa	 ﾠcost	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexceeds	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprogram	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfarm.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠsixth	 ﾠand	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdisconnect	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠfarmers’	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ
makers	 ﾠexpectations	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmechanics	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠcalculations.	 ﾠ
Returns	 ﾠin	 ﾠfarming	 ﾠare	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠmeasured	 ﾠby	 ﾠnet	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠbest	 ﾠa	 ﾠflawed	 ﾠ
measure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠand	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsystematically	 ﾠunderstate	 ﾠactual	 ﾠ
returns	 ﾠ(Freshwater,	 ﾠ2007).	 ﾠWe	 ﾠknow	 ﾠa	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠfarming	 ﾠ
comes	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠin	 ﾠwealth	 ﾠand	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠrarely	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠin	 ﾠcalculating	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠ
return	 ﾠrelationships	 ﾠin	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠformation.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition	 ﾠnet	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
problematic	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠon	 ﾠits	 ﾠown.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠmeasured	 ﾠbut	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠresidual	 ﾠ
obtained	 ﾠby	 ﾠsubtracting	 ﾠexpenses	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠrevenues,	 ﾠso	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠin	 ﾠeither	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
indicators	 ﾠcan	 ﾠinduce	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠin	 ﾠnet	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome.	 ﾠBecause	 ﾠfarming	 ﾠis	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
risks,	 ﾠnet	 ﾠincome	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠyear	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠgood	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
underlying	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠrelationship;	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfew	 ﾠdata	 ﾠsets	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠnet	 ﾠ
income	 ﾠover	 ﾠa	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠof	 ﾠtime	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠFinally,	 ﾠto	 ﾠsome	 ﾠextent	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
appropriate	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠof	 ﾠnet	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm.	 ﾠIndividual	 ﾠ
operators	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠmanipulate	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠto	 ﾠoptimize	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtax	 ﾠexposure	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠin	 ﾠcases	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠis	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠportfolio	 ﾠof	 ﾠincome	 ﾠsources	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
advantageous	 ﾠto	 ﾠreport	 ﾠlower	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠnet	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠtax	 ﾠ
burden	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhousehold.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthis	 ﾠresults	 ﾠin	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠamplifying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠ
variability	 ﾠin	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠthen	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠwill	 ﾠappear	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠriskier	 ﾠthan	 ﾠit	 ﾠactually	 ﾠ
is.	 ﾠ
Given	 ﾠthese	 ﾠreasons,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsurprised	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠbehave	 ﾠdifferently	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠmakers	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠtools.	 ﾠ
Most	 ﾠimportantly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreluctance	 ﾠto	 ﾠembrace	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtools	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
imperfect	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠare	 ﾠmade.	 ﾠFarmers	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠirrational	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbehavior,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnot	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠare	 ﾠmade.	 ﾠ
Policies	 ﾠfor	 ﾠRisk	 ﾠManagement	 ﾠ
Currently	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠthree	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠapproaches	 ﾠto	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠpolicy.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
roughly	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠBank	 ﾠand	 ﾠFAO,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
considerable	 ﾠoverlap	 ﾠamong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthree	 ﾠapproaches	 ﾠin	 ﾠpractice.	 ﾠEach	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
grounded	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠfacing	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
possibilities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠoperate	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
policy	 ﾠwill	 ﾠexist.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠthrust	 ﾠof	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
provide	 ﾠincome	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠdepending	 ﾠupon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠ
production	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠand	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠprices	 ﾠ(	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠ2000,	 ﾠOECD,	 ﾠ2009b).	 ﾠMore	 ﾠ
recently	 ﾠsome	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠhave	 ﾠmoved	 ﾠto	 ﾠmore	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmitigation	 ﾠ
approaches,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcommodity	 ﾠprices,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠ
remains	 ﾠfocused	 ﾠon	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠsupport.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠare	 ﾠwell	 ﾠintegrated	 ﾠinto	 ﾠ
market	 ﾠeconomies	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠrecords	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
member	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠare	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠenough	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠa	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠ
management	 ﾠapproach.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠBank	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠthat	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠseverely	 ﾠimpacts	 ﾠlow	 ﾠincome	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠimpedes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodernization	 ﾠof	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
leads	 ﾠto	 ﾠlow	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincomes	 ﾠand	 ﾠlow	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠproductivity	 ﾠ(World	 ﾠBank,	 ﾠ2005).	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠBank	 ﾠhas	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠa	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠpart	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠbased	 ﾠupon	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
integration	 ﾠof	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠinto	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠeconomies	 ﾠand	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠindex	 ﾠbased	 ﾠ
insurance	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠdisasters.	 ﾠIndex	 ﾠbased	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠdisaster	 ﾠinsurance	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
preferred	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠare	 ﾠoften	 ﾠonly	 ﾠweakly	 ﾠintegrated	 ﾠinto	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠ
so	 ﾠprices	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgood	 ﾠindicators,	 ﾠand	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠrecords	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠreadily	 ﾠ
available.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠan	 ﾠindex	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠan	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠmeasured	 ﾠtrigger	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠbased	 ﾠpayouts.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠFAO	 ﾠhas	 ﾠhistorically	 ﾠfollowed	 ﾠa	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠto	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement,	 ﾠlivelihood	 ﾠ
strategies,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠemphasized	 ﾠplacing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠ
context	 ﾠ(FAO,	 ﾠ2005).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠrecognizes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeven	 ﾠin	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ
farm	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠand	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠare	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠand	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnonfarm	 ﾠoptions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
investments	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠcompete	 ﾠwith	 ﾠor	 ﾠcomplement	 ﾠfarming.	 ﾠA	 ﾠmain	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFAO	 ﾠ
approach	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠimprove	 ﾠthe	 ﾠviability	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhousehold.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcan	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ
farm	 ﾠand	 ﾠnonfarm	 ﾠstrategies.	 ﾠMost	 ﾠimportantly	 ﾠthis	 ﾠportfolio	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠresults	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
focus	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiversification	 ﾠboth	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠand	 ﾠoff	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
mitigate	 ﾠrisk.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Clearly	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠapproaches	 ﾠreflects	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠ
facing	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠare	 ﾠorganized	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthese	 ﾠconditions.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
essence	 ﾠeach	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠreflects	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠ“structure	 ﾠof	 ﾠagriculture”.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
actual	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcorrespond	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠimagined	 ﾠby	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠmakers	 ﾠthan	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠput	 ﾠin	 ﾠplace	 ﾠwill	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠless	 ﾠ
risk	 ﾠmitigation	 ﾠthan	 ﾠwas	 ﾠexpected.	 ﾠ
Structure	 ﾠof	 ﾠAgriculture	 ﾠand	 ﾠRisk	 ﾠManagement	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠintroduced	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreceding	 ﾠparagraph	 ﾠis	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠ
Agricultural	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠhas	 ﾠevolved	 ﾠover	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠ100	 ﾠyears.	 ﾠ
Historically,	 ﾠa	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreservation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠ
farm,	 ﾠreflecting	 ﾠa	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠand	 ﾠfull	 ﾠtime	 ﾠfarmers.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠhas	 ﾠchanged	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠquestionable	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠthat	 ﾠunderpins	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ
development	 ﾠhas	 ﾠadequately	 ﾠcaptured	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstructural	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
actual	 ﾠways	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠmake	 ﾠdecisions.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠConventional	 ﾠApproach	 ﾠ
To	 ﾠelaborate,	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠof	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠ(Figure	 ﾠ1).	 ﾠ
Model	 ﾠ1	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠloosely	 ﾠthought	 ﾠof	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠthat	 ﾠunderpins	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ
development	 ﾠand	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠcountries3.	 ﾠA	 ﾠbi-ﾭ‐modal	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
agriculture	 ﾠexists	 ﾠin	 ﾠmost	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠ
numbers	 ﾠare	 ﾠfull	 ﾠtime	 ﾠenterprises	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvast	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠ
income	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠand	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠoutput.	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbulk	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠwas	 ﾠdelivered	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠcommodity	 ﾠpayments	 ﾠand	 ﾠremain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠshifts	 ﾠto	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠ
management.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠare	 ﾠseen	 ﾠas	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠtechnical	 ﾠefficiency,	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
open	 ﾠto	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠbased	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠstrategies	 ﾠand	 ﾠare	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠnew	 ﾠ
technicality	 ﾠand	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠproductivity.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠproportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
aggregate	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠconstitutes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcore	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠof	 ﾠproducers	 ﾠwho	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠ
OECD	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠand	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠwith	 ﾠfood	 ﾠand	 ﾠfiber.	 ﾠ
Over	 ﾠtime	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠhave	 ﾠreduced	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommodities	 ﾠthey	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠeven	 ﾠ
though	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmitigation	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠon-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠdiversification.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ
example,	 ﾠcombining	 ﾠlivestock	 ﾠand	 ﾠcrop	 ﾠenterprises	 ﾠis	 ﾠwidely	 ﾠrecognized	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
providing	 ﾠincome	 ﾠstability	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠlow	 ﾠcrop	 ﾠprices	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcorrelated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠ
livestock	 ﾠprices	 ﾠand	 ﾠvice	 ﾠversa	 ﾠ(OECD	 ﾠ2009b,	 ﾠp.112).	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcombined	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠprograms	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠincome	 ﾠstability	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincome	 ﾠenhancing	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠspecialization	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbiased	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠinherently	 ﾠless	 ﾠ
stable	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠ(Mafoua-ﾭ‐Koukebene,	 ﾠHornbaker	 ﾠand	 ﾠSherrick.	 ﾠ1996).	 ﾠIf	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠis	 ﾠincreasing,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠwell	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
encouraged	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠ	 ﾠFrance	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠexception	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsituation,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠFrench	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
implemented	 ﾠCAP	 ﾠprograms	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠframework	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfavors	 ﾠmedium,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
family	 ﾠsize,	 ﾠfarms.	 ﾠFrench	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠto	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
farms	 ﾠand	 ﾠlower	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠto	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠor	 ﾠsmaller	 ﾠfarms.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠFrance	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
both	 ﾠfewer	 ﾠpart-ﾭ‐time	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠthan	 ﾠits	 ﾠpeers	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠuniform	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠsize	 ﾠdistribution.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠgroup,	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠup	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarmers,	 ﾠoperates	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠ
farms	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠresources	 ﾠand	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠonly	 ﾠa	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
household	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠand	 ﾠincome.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠhave	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
support,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠwas	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠto	 ﾠtrigger	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠenough	 ﾠ
commodity	 ﾠpayments	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠany	 ﾠreal	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠability	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠhousehold.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠthey	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠassets	 ﾠthan	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠshare	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠnumbers,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠsmaller	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠoutput.	 ﾠPart	 ﾠtime	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
typically	 ﾠseen	 ﾠas	 ﾠinefficient	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠproducers	 ﾠwith	 ﾠeither	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠ
per	 ﾠunit	 ﾠof	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠor	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠdepending	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthey	 ﾠre	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠ
resource	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠor	 ﾠlife-ﾭ‐style	 ﾠfarms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠargument	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠmodel,	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
significant	 ﾠeconomies	 ﾠof	 ﾠscale,	 ﾠmight	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠshould	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠpurposes.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠremain	 ﾠa	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠgenerating	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
support.	 ﾠWere	 ﾠthey	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexcluded	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrationale	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
difficult.	 ﾠSmall	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠnumbers	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐being	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠissues.	 ﾠSmall	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠalso	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠlow	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
below	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠincome	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwages	 ﾠand	 ﾠsalaries.	 ﾠHence,	 ﾠsmaller	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠface	 ﾠof	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠit	 ﾠappeals	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsupport.	 ﾠ
Risk	 ﾠManagement	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠunder	 ﾠconventional	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠconventional	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠtends	 ﾠto	 ﾠlook	 ﾠat	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠsector	 ﾠin	 ﾠisolation,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
provides	 ﾠan	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠrationale	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmitigation	 ﾠpolicies.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
agriculture	 ﾠfocuses	 ﾠon	 ﾠimproving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcompetitiveness	 ﾠand	 ﾠtechnical	 ﾠefficiency	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
farm	 ﾠproduction,	 ﾠwhich,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠeconomies	 ﾠof	 ﾠscale,	 ﾠis	 ﾠmost	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
come	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠin	 ﾠcapitalization	 ﾠand	 ﾠspecialization	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfarms.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠ
if	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠface	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠprice	 ﾠand	 ﾠyield	 ﾠinstability	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
unwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠundertake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinvestments	 ﾠin	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠproductivity	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠ
requires.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcircumstance	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtransfers	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsocially	 ﾠoptimal	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠresult	 ﾠin	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠcompensate	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk.	 ﾠEssentially	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
argument	 ﾠhinges	 ﾠon	 ﾠan	 ﾠinability	 ﾠof	 ﾠspecialized	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfull	 ﾠtime	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠto	 ﾠinternalize	 ﾠ
risk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthen	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocialization	 ﾠof	 ﾠrisk.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
An	 ﾠIntegrated	 ﾠApproach	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠon	 ﾠagriculture,	 ﾠModel	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠviews	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠintegral	 ﾠpart	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomy,	 ﾠand	 ﾠapproaches	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
farm	 ﾠhousehold,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠlooking	 ﾠat	 ﾠresource	 ﾠendowments	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommodity	 ﾠ
outputs	 ﾠin	 ﾠfarming.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Farm	 ﾠassets	 ﾠand	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠ
First,	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠassets	 ﾠare	 ﾠseen	 ﾠas	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠmarket.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠregions	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
western	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠreturns	 ﾠon	 ﾠfarmland	 ﾠare	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠand	 ﾠcan	 ﾠattract	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠ
investors	 ﾠ(Painter,	 ﾠ1997;	 ﾠAgcapita).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcontext,	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠcontractual	 ﾠagreements	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠeffectively	 ﾠredistribute	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠowners	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
operators	 ﾠ(Allen	 ﾠand	 ﾠLueck,	 ﾠ2003).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠcases	 ﾠof	 ﾠcrop	 ﾠsharing,	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠis	 ﾠeffectively	 ﾠshare	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠowner	 ﾠand	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠoperator.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠeven	 ﾠin	 ﾠcases	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠoperators	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
cash	 ﾠrent	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠasset,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠleverage	 ﾠand	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠ
financing	 ﾠare	 ﾠreduced	 ﾠ(Baker	 ﾠand	 ﾠThomassin,	 ﾠ1989).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠpurchases	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠby	 ﾠinvestors	 ﾠseeking	 ﾠportfolio	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠ
whose	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠis	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠattest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
opportunities	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠof	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠinvestors	 ﾠto	 ﾠexploit	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ(Top	 ﾠCrop	 ﾠ
Manager	 ﾠ).	 ﾠAnd,	 ﾠto	 ﾠsome	 ﾠextent	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠ
management	 ﾠa	 ﾠlesser	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠpolicy,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthen	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠfully	 ﾠ
exploit	 ﾠthe	 ﾠalleged	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠeconomies	 ﾠof	 ﾠscale	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠfaced	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
individual	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠand	 ﾠhouseholds.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrents	 ﾠare	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
competitive	 ﾠmarket,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠany	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubsidized	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠ
management	 ﾠprogram	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcaptured	 ﾠin	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠpart	 ﾠby	 ﾠland	 ﾠowners,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
presumably	 ﾠhold	 ﾠwell	 ﾠdiversified	 ﾠportfolios	 ﾠdominated	 ﾠby	 ﾠnon	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠassets.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Farm	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠunits	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠalso	 ﾠassumes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠassets	 ﾠand	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠallocated	 ﾠacross	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠmaximizing	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠwill	 ﾠallocate	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
resources	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmarginal	 ﾠreturns	 ﾠare	 ﾠequalized.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠallocate	 ﾠ
resources	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠcost	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠshould	 ﾠmaximize	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
society’s	 ﾠwelfare.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠaddition,	 ﾠif	 ﾠa	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠis	 ﾠoperated	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠfull	 ﾠtime	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠoften	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
few	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠuses	 ﾠfor	 ﾠits	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠand	 ﾠcapital,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠas	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠa	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠfarming.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthese	 ﾠalternatives	 ﾠexists,	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠand	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
allocate	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠshares	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠinputs	 ﾠto	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠuses,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
reduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtechnical	 ﾠefficiency	 ﾠof	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠit	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠthe	 ﾠefficiency	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠresource	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠeconomy4.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠ
provide	 ﾠonly	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠand	 ﾠincome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
opportunity	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠgetting	 ﾠbigger	 ﾠis	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠhigh.	 ﾠSimilarly,	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
considerable	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠearned	 ﾠincome	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠcan	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠmore	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmargin	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠthan	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠfactor	 ﾠin	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠenvironment	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
operates.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠenvironment	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagronomic	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	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4	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠby	 ﾠLien,	 ﾠKumbhakar	 ﾠand	 ﾠHardaker	 ﾠ(2010)	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠno	 ﾠloss	 ﾠof	 ﾠtechnical	 ﾠefficiency	 ﾠwith	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠwork.	 ﾠTheir	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠin	 ﾠNorway	 ﾠshowed	 ﾠ
no	 ﾠlink	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠsize	 ﾠand	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠwork	 ﾠand	 ﾠno	 ﾠreduction	 ﾠin	 ﾠtechnical	 ﾠefficiency	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠwork.	 ﾠSimilarly	 ﾠJette-ﾭ‐Nantel,	 ﾠFreshwater,	 ﾠBeaulieu	 ﾠand	 ﾠKatchova	 ﾠshow	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠoperators	 ﾠof	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠcommercial	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠ
income	 ﾠto	 ﾠmitigate	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠrisk.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠon	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsize	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠadjustment	 ﾠin	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠthan	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsmaller	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠ
experiencing	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠand	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠconditions.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠalso	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠand	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠ
support	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthese	 ﾠalter	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠreturns.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠ
economy	 ﾠcan	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠin	 ﾠoffering	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthere	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠrates	 ﾠof	 ﾠreturn,	 ﾠor	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐monetary	 ﾠbenefits5.	 ﾠMore	 ﾠ
complex	 ﾠrural	 ﾠeconomies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexhibit	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
development	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠfull-ﾭ‐time	 ﾠfarming.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠ
consequently	 ﾠone	 ﾠfinds	 ﾠfull	 ﾠtime	 ﾠfarming	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠin	 ﾠregions	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠ
agriculture	 ﾠremains	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠor	 ﾠvalue-ﾭ‐added.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
From	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠview,	 ﾠ	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠis	 ﾠfar	 ﾠless	 ﾠ
clear.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠboth	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠand	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠhave	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
investment	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠand	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠof	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthese	 ﾠsizes	 ﾠtake	 ﾠadvantage	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
opportunities,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠin	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠis	 ﾠreadily	 ﾠmanaged	 ﾠby	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhousehold.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠthere	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠregions	 ﾠor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
produce	 ﾠsome	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠcommodities	 ﾠ(milk),	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
problematic,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠon	 ﾠterms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠfavorable	 ﾠto	 ﾠfarmers.	 ﾠ
Indeed	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠprograms	 ﾠis	 ﾠdoubly	 ﾠdistorting.	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠresults	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
transfers	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessary,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsecondarily	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
programs	 ﾠalters	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠapproaches.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠresult	 ﾠ
farmers	 ﾠare	 ﾠless	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠself	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠeither	 ﾠon	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠ
diversification	 ﾠor	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠemployment.	 ﾠMoreover	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠless	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠhold	 ﾠadequate	 ﾠcash	 ﾠreserves	 ﾠor	 ﾠuntapped	 ﾠlines	 ﾠof	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐
protection.	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠshown	 ﾠin	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdetail	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠfor	 ﾠCanada,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠin	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠincreasingly	 ﾠturning	 ﾠto	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠemployment,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
phenomenon	 ﾠresults	 ﾠin	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠin	 ﾠfarming	 ﾠplaying	 ﾠa	 ﾠvery	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠby	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstill	 ﾠview	 ﾠfull	 ﾠtime	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠnorm.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠworth	 ﾠconsidering	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFAO	 ﾠ“livelihood”	 ﾠ
approach	 ﾠto	 ﾠmanaging	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠin	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠadapted	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠ
context.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠas	 ﾠin	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlivelihood	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠ
farmers	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffset	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠ
diversification.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠhas	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠ
positive	 ﾠcorrelation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠsome	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠby	 ﾠDa	 ﾠRocha	 ﾠand	 ﾠRestucia	 ﾠ
(2006)	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠis	 ﾠeffectively	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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5	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠone	 ﾠmember	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
household	 ﾠto	 ﾠseek	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠgain	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠbenefits.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠ
farmers	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠinsurance	 ﾠindividually,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠvery	 ﾠexpensive	 ﾠand	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠ
coverage	 ﾠcompared	 ﾠto	 ﾠplans	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠby	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠor	 ﾠcorporations.	 ﾠOff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠ
employment	 ﾠcan	 ﾠalso	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
connections	 ﾠand	 ﾠindependence.	 ﾠuncorrelated,	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠnegatively	 ﾠcorrelated,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠsectors	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
economy	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠconstruction,	 ﾠmanufacturing,	 ﾠand	 ﾠretail.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠenvironment	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
natural	 ﾠportfolio	 ﾠwill	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠfarming	 ﾠand	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠone	 ﾠother	 ﾠincome	 ﾠsource,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠ
large	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmitigation	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠobtained	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠlow	 ﾠreductions	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
expected	 ﾠincome.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠexceptions	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠcome	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠone	 ﾠor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠof	 ﾠthree	 ﾠimpediments	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
forming	 ﾠa	 ﾠportfolio.	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠthere	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠ
alternatives	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠregions.	 ﾠSecond,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreturns	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠ
relative	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠactivities,	 ﾠso	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠrational	 ﾠto	 ﾠspecialize	 ﾠin	 ﾠfarming.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠ
finally,	 ﾠif	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠprograms	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠin	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
point	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠissue	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠmay	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠto	 ﾠremain	 ﾠ
specialized	 ﾠin	 ﾠfarming.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠa	 ﾠcombination	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠis	 ﾠrelevant,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠin	 ﾠthose	 ﾠregions	 ﾠof	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠis	 ﾠundiversified	 ﾠand	 ﾠremains	 ﾠspecialized	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
agricultural	 ﾠproduction.	 ﾠConversely,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthose	 ﾠregions	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
large	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrural	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠis	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠdiversified,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmid-ﾭ‐west	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠ
States,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIle	 ﾠde	 ﾠFrance	 ﾠsurrounding	 ﾠParis,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPo	 ﾠValley	 ﾠin	 ﾠItaly,	 ﾠor	 ﾠSouthern	 ﾠ
Ontario	 ﾠin	 ﾠCanada,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠfind	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠ
income	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠor	 ﾠinvestments.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthese	 ﾠregions	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠincome	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠfar	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthan	 ﾠin	 ﾠrural	 ﾠareas	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠspecialized	 ﾠin	 ﾠfarming,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
agriculture	 ﾠin	 ﾠregional	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠis	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠlow.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠsummary,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠof	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠabove	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmutually	 ﾠ
independent,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠonly	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠways	 ﾠof	 ﾠdescribing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠsituation.	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠare	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠfor	 ﾠjustifying	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠanswers	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ–	 ﾠis	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠ
management	 ﾠan	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠfor	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠpolicy?	 ﾠWhile,	 ﾠby	 ﾠfocusing	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
agriculture	 ﾠin	 ﾠisolation,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconventional	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠcan	 ﾠrationalize	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠfunction,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintegrated	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠjustify	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠ
management	 ﾠprograms	 ﾠeven	 ﾠin	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠeconomies	 ﾠof	 ﾠscale.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠcan,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
used	 ﾠto	 ﾠhighlight	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsynergies	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠa	 ﾠhealthy	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠsector	 ﾠand	 ﾠrural	 ﾠ
development.	 ﾠ
Rural	 ﾠDevelopment	 ﾠas	 ﾠRisk	 ﾠMitigation	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmitigation	 ﾠtechnique	 ﾠthere	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐
farm	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠopportunities.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠleads	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrural	 ﾠ
development	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmitigation	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠfor	 ﾠagriculture.	 ﾠA	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdiversified	 ﾠrural	 ﾠ
economy	 ﾠimproves	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠto	 ﾠgain	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠ
opportunities	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠquality	 ﾠof	 ﾠlife	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
broader	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠand	 ﾠservices.	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠseries	 ﾠof	 ﾠpapers	 ﾠby	 ﾠKostov	 ﾠand	 ﾠLingard	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠintroduced	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrural	 ﾠ
development	 ﾠis	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠ(2001,	 ﾠ2003,	 ﾠ2004).	 ﾠTheir	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrural	 ﾠ
development	 ﾠtransforms	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecialized	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfaces	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠnarrow	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠbase	 ﾠand	 ﾠsusceptibility	 ﾠto	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠshocks	 ﾠto	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠstable.	 ﾠRural	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠresults	 ﾠin	 ﾠdiversification	 ﾠand	 ﾠdeepening	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠ
economy,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠboth	 ﾠmore	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠand	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
less	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠand	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠshocks.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠtypical	 ﾠperception	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠ
agriculture	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠsource	 ﾠof	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠsource	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
regional	 ﾠexports.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠthere	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠother	 ﾠsectors	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
largely	 ﾠoriented	 ﾠto	 ﾠserving	 ﾠfarming	 ﾠand	 ﾠfarmers,	 ﾠso	 ﾠinstability	 ﾠin	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠleads	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
general	 ﾠregional	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠinstability.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠlow	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠprices	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠlow	 ﾠ
incomes	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall.	 ﾠAnd,	 ﾠhistorically	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠprices	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠseen	 ﾠas	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠ
support	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠrural	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠand	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
An	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠthat	 ﾠKostov	 ﾠand	 ﾠLingard	 ﾠmake	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrural	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠalters	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠenvironment	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠenterprises	 ﾠand	 ﾠentrepreneurs	 ﾠoperate	 ﾠand	 ﾠthis	 ﾠopens	 ﾠup	 ﾠ
new	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠand	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠrelationships.	 ﾠRural	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠ
reshapes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmilieu	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠfarming	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠplace.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠa	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠcan	 ﾠearn	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
significant	 ﾠamount	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠincome	 ﾠoff	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠless	 ﾠexposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
underlying	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠin	 ﾠagriculture,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthese	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠremain	 ﾠunaltered.	 ﾠWith	 ﾠ
diversification,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠto	 ﾠundertake	 ﾠriskier	 ﾠfarming	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
capture	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠadverse	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠ
outcomes	 ﾠare	 ﾠsmaller.	 ﾠ
Moreover,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregion	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠrural	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠcan	 ﾠspillover	 ﾠ
onto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhousehold.	 ﾠA	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdiversified	 ﾠand	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
stable	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠamenities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠ
variety	 ﾠof:	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠservices,	 ﾠretail	 ﾠestablishments	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠopportunities.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
environment	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠcan	 ﾠexpand	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime	 ﾠthat	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠ
becomes	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmaller	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠregional	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠand	 ﾠemployment.	 ﾠEssentially	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
simply	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregional	 ﾠcounterpart	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠwith	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠin	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠ
countries.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠreshaping	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCAP	 ﾠin	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠto	 ﾠshift	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠto	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠ
via	 ﾠPillar	 ﾠ1	 ﾠto	 ﾠrural	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠfollows	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlogic.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠPillar	 ﾠ2	 ﾠfunds,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
exception	 ﾠof	 ﾠAxis	 ﾠFour	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠLEADER,	 ﾠremain	 ﾠfocused	 ﾠon	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠbased	 ﾠ
diversification.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠsome	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠto	 ﾠmanage	 ﾠ
risk	 ﾠby	 ﾠadding	 ﾠnew	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠfarm,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠagri-ﾭ‐tourism	 ﾠor	 ﾠprocessing,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠin	 ﾠscope	 ﾠand	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠas	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠincome	 ﾠor	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠ
management	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠto	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠrural	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠefforts.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠessence	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠKostov	 ﾠand	 ﾠLingard	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠa	 ﾠbridge	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠ
risk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠstrategies	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlivelihood	 ﾠ
approach	 ﾠchampioned	 ﾠby	 ﾠFAO.	 ﾠBy	 ﾠadding	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠin	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠor	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠrisk.	 ﾠThus	 ﾠa	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠ
powerful	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmitigation	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠexpand	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠinvestments	 ﾠin	 ﾠrural	 ﾠdevelopment.	 ﾠSome	 ﾠEvidence	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠ
On	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠnow	 ﾠearn	 ﾠfar	 ﾠmore	 ﾠincome	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠsources	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠdo	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠfarming6.	 ﾠConsequently	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠnow	 ﾠhave	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠ
total	 ﾠincomes	 ﾠthan	 ﾠdo	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠCanadian	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠnet	 ﾠworth	 ﾠis	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠ
multiples	 ﾠhigher.	 ﾠA	 ﾠclear	 ﾠconsequence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
decoupling	 ﾠof	 ﾠlow	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠincome	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠ(Figure2).	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠreporting	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠnet	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincomes	 ﾠhas	 ﾠincreased,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
farm	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlow	 ﾠincome	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfallen.	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠin	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠyears	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠ
payments	 ﾠare	 ﾠroughly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠsize	 ﾠas	 ﾠnet	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
provided	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠprograms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Under	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconventional	 ﾠview,	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠseen	 ﾠas	 ﾠonly	 ﾠplaying	 ﾠa	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠ
role	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠoutput.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠseems	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠless	 ﾠaccurate	 ﾠdescription	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠagriculture.	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ3	 ﾠ
shows	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠby	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠsales	 ﾠclass	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠoperators.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠoperators	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠbe	 ﾠleast	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠsource	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠlabor.	 ﾠYet	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠoperator	 ﾠ
off-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhighest	 ﾠsales	 ﾠclass	 ﾠ(greater	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ$.5	 ﾠmillion)	 ﾠis	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
same	 ﾠas	 ﾠfor	 ﾠoperators	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsmallest	 ﾠsales	 ﾠclass	 ﾠ(between	 ﾠ$10,000	 ﾠand	 ﾠ$50,000).	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlargest	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠis	 ﾠnow	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠsize	 ﾠas	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠprogram	 ﾠ
payments,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠthan	 ﾠprogram	 ﾠpayments	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠother	 ﾠsize	 ﾠclasses.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
alone	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠtranscends	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠsize	 ﾠclass	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
at	 ﾠleast	 ﾠas	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠa	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠoperator	 ﾠincome	 ﾠas	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠpayments.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠ
investment	 ﾠincome	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠproportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠas	 ﾠsales	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠ
get	 ﾠbigger,	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠincome	 ﾠis	 ﾠby	 ﾠfar	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠshare.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsure	 ﾠnet	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠ
income	 ﾠstill	 ﾠexceeds	 ﾠearned	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠlargest	 ﾠsales	 ﾠclass,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthere	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠdifference.	 ﾠ
When	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠare	 ﾠexamined	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠis	 ﾠeven	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠ
(Figure	 ﾠ4).	 ﾠOnce	 ﾠagain	 ﾠfocusing	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlargest	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠ
income	 ﾠfor	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠand	 ﾠvery	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠis	 ﾠfar	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthan	 ﾠprogram	 ﾠpayments,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠlargest,	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠexceeds	 ﾠ
market	 ﾠincome	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠenterprise.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠone	 ﾠyear	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
growth	 ﾠrate	 ﾠof	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠwas	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠlargest	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠsizes	 ﾠthan	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
smaller	 ﾠfarms,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠbut	 ﾠvery	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfarms,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠrate	 ﾠof	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠ
exceeded	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠin	 ﾠnet	 ﾠoperating	 ﾠincome.	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ5	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsales	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ$100,000,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠall	 ﾠcommercial	 ﾠfarms.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ45%	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠCanada.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtable	 ﾠshows	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠincome	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠand	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlow	 ﾠ
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6	 ﾠAll	 ﾠdata	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsection	 ﾠis	 ﾠderived	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠStatistics	 ﾠCanada:	 ﾠStatistics	 ﾠon	 ﾠIncome	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Farm	 ﾠOperators	 ﾠ2007	 ﾠand	 ﾠStatistics	 ﾠCanada:	 ﾠStatistics	 ﾠon	 ﾠIncome	 ﾠof	 ﾠFarm	 ﾠFamilies	 ﾠ
2007.	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠincome	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠlosses	 ﾠand	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome.	 ﾠHouseholds	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ$50,000	 ﾠin	 ﾠincome	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠincome	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
roughly	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠmagnitude.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ$100,000	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
total	 ﾠincome,	 ﾠon	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠroughly	 ﾠ$97,000	 ﾠcame	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
$92,000	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠnet	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ$70,000	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠcoming	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
employment.	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ6	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠplays	 ﾠa	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠmost	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
figure	 ﾠincome	 ﾠis	 ﾠdecomposed	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthree	 ﾠsources	 ﾠ–	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠincome,	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠ
payments	 ﾠand	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome,	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ2007	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlargest	 ﾠcomponent	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
income	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhogs	 ﾠand	 ﾠpoultry.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠhogs	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠpayments	 ﾠ
account	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠpoultry	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠmarketing	 ﾠboards	 ﾠ
allow	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠincome	 ﾠto	 ﾠdominate.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠoilseed	 ﾠand	 ﾠgrain	 ﾠfarms,	 ﾠfruit	 ﾠand	 ﾠtree	 ﾠnut	 ﾠ
farms,	 ﾠand	 ﾠbeef	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠexceeds	 ﾠ50%	 ﾠof	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠincome.	 ﾠFinally,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
all	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhog	 ﾠand	 ﾠpig	 ﾠproducers,	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠplays	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠrole	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠpayments.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Conclusion	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠare	 ﾠmultiple	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmitigation	 ﾠprograms	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠbroadly	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠby	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠunless	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠsubsidized,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
seem	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠreason	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfound	 ﾠa	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠalternative.	 ﾠOff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠ
income	 ﾠis	 ﾠnow	 ﾠa	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠsource	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠincome	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠsizes	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
largely	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimprovements	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
national	 ﾠincome	 ﾠdistributions.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠalso	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmitigation	 ﾠ
strategy	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠuncorrelated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome.	 ﾠIndeed	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
risk	 ﾠseen	 ﾠin	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠby	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
secure	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠincome	 ﾠstream.	 ﾠ
Canadian	 ﾠdata	 ﾠconfirms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠsizes	 ﾠcommonly	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠsources	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
off-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠand	 ﾠinvestments.	 ﾠMoreover	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠ
high	 ﾠincidence	 ﾠof	 ﾠoperator	 ﾠinvolvement	 ﾠin	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠemployment,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
members	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhousehold.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠsome	 ﾠextent	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsome	 ﾠadvantages	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠadopting	 ﾠa	 ﾠportfolio	 ﾠof	 ﾠincome	 ﾠsources.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
hired	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠfree	 ﾠoperators	 ﾠto	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠ
activities.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠportfolio	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarming	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠmore	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
interest	 ﾠin	 ﾠwealthy	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠadding	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠassets	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠportfolio	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
increased.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠa	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠfew	 ﾠ
opportunities	 ﾠto	 ﾠhold	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠassets	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠpassive	 ﾠinvestments.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Once	 ﾠthe	 ﾠportfolio	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarming	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠare	 ﾠrecognized,	 ﾠeither	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
traditional	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠor	 ﾠby	 ﾠothers	 ﾠ(investors),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠon	 ﾠincome	 ﾠ
variability	 ﾠin	 ﾠfarming	 ﾠchanges.	 ﾠVariability	 ﾠin	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠnow	 ﾠbecomes	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠ
problem	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠcorrelated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠincome	 ﾠsources.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠ
governments	 ﾠand	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠorganizations	 ﾠhave	 ﾠinterpreted	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠvariability	 ﾠin	 ﾠnet	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠcrying	 ﾠout	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠto	 ﾠmitigate	 ﾠrisk,7	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠ
risk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠon	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐setting	 ﾠcatastrophic	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠencouraging	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠ
integration	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠsector	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠrural	 ﾠeconomy,	 ﾠeither	 ﾠby	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠequity	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsector	 ﾠand/or	 ﾠby	 ﾠfostering	 ﾠmore	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
better	 ﾠways	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfrequent	 ﾠrisk.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠavailability	 ﾠof	 ﾠequity	 ﾠ
financing	 ﾠand	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠare	 ﾠaspatial	 ﾠapproaches	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠapplied	 ﾠacross	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠcountry;	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠvary	 ﾠby	 ﾠregion,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠin	 ﾠrural	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠin	 ﾠthose	 ﾠregions	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠ
employment	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠare	 ﾠweak	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠpolicy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“layers	 ﾠof	 ﾠrisk”	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠproposed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠ
income	 ﾠspills	 ﾠacross	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠlayers	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠlayer	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinsurance	 ﾠ
layer	 ﾠ(OECD	 ﾠ2009,	 ﾠp.30).	 ﾠWith	 ﾠincome	 ﾠdiversification	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcall	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠinsurance	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠfull	 ﾠtime	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠand	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
managed	 ﾠinternally	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠengaged	 ﾠin	 ﾠpart-ﾭ‐time	 ﾠfarming.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
sure	 ﾠsome	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠwill	 ﾠstill	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠpolicy.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ
example,	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐farm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠis	 ﾠunlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠadequate	 ﾠbuffer	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcatastrophic	 ﾠrisk.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠaddition,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠregions	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠprospects	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠrural	 ﾠ
development	 ﾠstrategies	 ﾠare	 ﾠlimited.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠregions	 ﾠare	 ﾠmost	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠremote	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
limited	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠattract	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠother	 ﾠthan	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠoccupations.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthee	 ﾠ
places	 ﾠif	 ﾠfarming	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠviable	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠof	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠpublicly	 ﾠsupported	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠtools,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
tools	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcarefully	 ﾠcalibrated	 ﾠto	 ﾠonly	 ﾠstabilize	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠnot	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
7	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtypical	 ﾠargument	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠin	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠ
incomes	 ﾠto	 ﾠvia	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“fair”	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠrelationship.	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Figure	 ﾠ2:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Two	 ﾠPossible	 ﾠStructures	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Agriculture
Model	 ﾠ1 
• Large	 ﾠfarms 
– Full	 ﾠtime	 ﾠoperator 
– Resources	 ﾠallocated	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
improve	 ﾠfarm 
– Increased	 ﾠproductivity	 ﾠ
requires	 ﾠspecialization	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
capital,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠ
risk 
• Small	 ﾠfarms 
– Part	 ﾠtime	 ﾠoperator 
– Resources	 ﾠallocated	 ﾠacross	 ﾠ
multiple	 ﾠactivities 
– Low	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠproductivity 
Model	 ﾠ2 
• Focus	 ﾠon	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠunit 
• All	 ﾠfarms	 ﾠallocate	 ﾠ
resources	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
opportunity	 ﾠcost 
• Size	 ﾠof	 ﾠfarm	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
determine	 ﾠbehavior	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 ﾠ
local	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠ
determine	 ﾠbehavior 	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